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Zachary K. Ostro* 
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative 
Traders: Further Limiting Limited Liability, and 
Missing an Opportunity to Curb Corporate 
Misconduct  
In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,1 the Supreme Court 
of the United States examined if the investment adviser of a mutual fund could be 
held directly liable for “mak[ing]” a knowingly false statement in the mutual fund’s 
prospectus under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b–5(b) and 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 Improperly relying on its prior 
holdings in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
where it expressly denied Rule 10b–5 primary liability to aiders and abettors,3 and 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., where it held that the 
misstatements of a company’s supplier must be directly relied upon by the 
company’s shareholders in order to be primarily liable,4 the Court held that an 
investment adviser firm of a mutual fund could not be liable under Rule 10b–5 
because it did not have “ultimate authority over the [false] statement.”5 In so 
holding, the Court improperly treated the independence of separate corporate 
entities as axiomatic, and misinterpreted (and vastly expanded) the protections 
from liability in Central Bank and Stoneridge — creating the opportunity for a 
loophole in corporate liability.6 Instead of opening the floodgates to litigation as the 
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 1. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).  
 2. Id. at 2299.  
 3. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we hold 
that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”).  
 4. 552 U.S. 148, 153 (2008).  
 5. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.  
 6. See infra Part IV.C.  
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majority suggested, a finding of liability would have ushered in a much-needed era 
of socially responsible corporate governance in the wake of the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis.7 Furthermore, this holding is not unique for the modern Court; it is a 
microcosm of a fervent pro-corporate jurisprudence that the Roberts Court 
continues to develop.8 When viewed individually and collectively, Janus and its 
sister cases pose a real and immediate threat to investors, consumers, and 
employees, by shielding business entities from liability and drastically increasing 
their influence (to the detriment of average citizens) in our economic and political 
processes.9 In each case, the Court has failed to properly balance corporate liability 
protections with citizens’ ability to receive just compensation following 
misconduct.10 
I. The Case  
Janus Investment Fund (“the Fund”) is a business trust that holds a family of 
mutual funds.11 Investors in the mutual funds own all of the Fund’s assets.12 
Although its own legal entity, at the time of the initial complaint, all of the officers 
of the Fund were also officers of the Fund’s investment adviser, Janus Capital 
Management (JCM) — a wholly owned subsidiary of Janus Capital Group, Inc. 
(JCG), a publicly traded company.13 Mutual funds are usually intended as long-
term investments, and, as such, speculative and volatile forms of trading such as 
market timing are generally considered to be unattractive to mutual fund 
shareholders.14 To this end, many of the Fund’s prospectuses stipulated that JCM 
 
 7. See infra Part IV.C.  
 8. See infra Part IV.D.  
 9. See infra Part IV.D. 
 10. See infra Part IV.D. 
 11. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Lit., 566 F.3d 111, 126 (4th Cir. 2009). A business trust, also referred to as a 
“Massachusetts Business Trust” or “common law trust” is an unincorporated business entity held in trust for its 
beneficiaries. See 13 AM. JUR. 2D Business Trusts § 1 (2011). Beneficiary rights to the corpus are transferable and 
may be evidenced in a certificate of ownership. Id.  
 12. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Lit., 566 F.3d at 126.  
 13. Id. at 115; see also Brief for Respondent at 4, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 
S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (“Every one of the Janus Funds’ 17 officers was a Vice 
President of JCM.”).  
 14. See Brief for Respondent at 6, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari). Market timing is the trading of securities that seeks to take 
advantage of discrepancies in a security’s recorded Net Asset Value (NAV) and its true market value. See In re 
Mutual Funds Inv. Lit., 529 F.3d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[I]nvestors move in and out of the funds to take 
advantage of the temporary differentials between the mutual funds’ daily–calculated ‘net asset value’ (‘NAV’) 
and the market price of the component stocks during the course of a day.”). For example, after a market closes, 
an event might occur which would alter a security’s true price yet would not be realized in its recorded NAV. Id. 
Therefore, due to time zone differences causing foreign markets to be closed while U.S. markets are open, if the 
security were a foreign asset, its NAV would stay constant until the close of U.S. markets. Id. Thus, an American 
trader in the interim would be able to buy the security at its recorded NAV and then sell it once the foreign 
market opens and the asset’s true value is reflected in its price — thereby allowing the trader to make a quick 
profit by exploiting the time delay in the security’s valuation. Id. However, the shortsightedness of such trading 
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would make efforts to curb market-timing activities by its traders; these were false 
statements.15 Officers of JCM and JCG, including JCG Chief Executive Officer Mark 
Winston, not only allowed market timing, but also continuously tracked, and 
received reports on, the activities.16 The allowance of market timing in the Fund 
became public knowledge in 2003 when then New York Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer filed a complaint against JCG and JCM for fraudulent trading.17  
As a result of Attorney General Spitzer’s allegations being made public, investors 
in the Fund withdrew heavily.18 This caused a chain reaction whereby JCM’s 
management fees declined, as did JCG’s total income and stock price — resulting in 
First Derivative Traders (First Derivative), a class of JCG shareholders, to bring 
claims against JCG and JCM.19 Their complaint alleged violations by JCG and JCM 
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b–5(b) for causing 
“certain misleading statements appearing in prospectuses for a number of 
individual Janus funds” which stated that market timing would be curbed.20 In 
addition to a direct liability claim, First Derivative also brought a control person 
claim against JCG for JCM’s actions per § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.21  
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6).22 According 
to the district court, JCG could not be liable as a Rule 10b–5(b) primary actor 
because it did not “make” false statements contained in the prospectuses; 
dissemination, and use of the Janus website, logo, and name, were insufficient for a 
finding of direct liability.23 Furthermore, the court held that JCM could not be liable 
to First Derivative because, as shareholders of the parent company and not 
investors in the Fund, there was no loss causation between the false statements in 
the prospectuses and drop in JCG’s stock price.24 Furthermore, without the requisite 
“nexus” between First Derivative’s loss and the issued prospectuses, JCG could not 
be held liable as a control person.25 
 
“can harm mutual fund investors by causing mutual funds to manage their portfolios in a manner that is 
disadvantageous to long-term shareholders” because the volatility of such trading is contradictory to the 
stability mutual fund investors expect. Id.  
 15. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Lit., 566 F.3d at 117.  
 16. Brief for Respondent at 4, 7, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari).  
 17. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Lit., 566 F.3d at 118. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at 115.  
 20. Id. at 114–15.  
 21. Id. at 114.  
 22. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F.Supp. 2d 618, 620, 624 (D. Md. 2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) 
(dismissing a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). 
 23. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d. at 621–22.  
 24. Id. at 623.  
 25. Id. at 623–24.  
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First Derivative appealed, arguing the district court improperly dismissed its 
complaint for failure to state a claim.26 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that First Derivative made a valid claim against 
JCM because the average investor would conclude, given JCM’s day-to-day control 
over the Fund, that JCM issued the statement, or at least would have approved of its 
issuance.27 However, the Circuit Court held that First Derivative did not have a 
valid Rule 10b–5(b) claim against JCG because it was too separate from the Fund’s 
day-to-day activities for an investor to infer JCG played a role in issuing the false 
statement.28 As such, according to the court, JCG’s potential liability was limited to 
control person liability per § 20(a) of the Act.29  
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide if JCM 
could be held primarily liable in a Rule 10b–5 claim for false statements made in the 
Fund’s prospectuses.30 
II. Legal Background 
Historically, courts have struggled to develop a properly balanced interpretation of 
Rule 10b–5.31 Determined to judicially create the necessary mechanics to ensure safe 
and open markets, while unwilling to legislate from the bench, the Supreme Court 
has slowly developed a more complete understanding of a Rule 10b–5 violation.32 
This piecemeal, and cautious, development of what constitutes a viable securities 
fraud led the Court to create a private right of action in Superintendent of Ins. of 
N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,33 and then, over the past forty years, to 
conservatively interpret that right.34 In so doing, the Court has read Rule 10b–5 with 
cautious liberality — avoiding judicial overreach, while working to ensure 
Congressional intent in enacting the Securities Exchange Act.35 However, 
development of that right has been scaled back in recent years — leading to Janus 
where the Court improperly limited the scope of Rule 10b–5 liabilities.36  
 
 
 
 26. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 2009).  
 27. Id. at 127. 
 28. Id. at 128.  
 29. Id. at 131.  
 30. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 130 S. Ct. 3499 (2010).  
 31. See infra Parts II.B–C.  
 32. See infra Parts II.B–C.  
 33. 404 U.S. 6, 12 n.9 (1971).  
 34. See infra Parts II.B–C.  
 35. See infra Parts II.B–C.  
 36. See infra Parts II.B–C.  
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A. Congress Passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the Wake of the Great 
Depression as a Means of Promoting Sound Financial Markets  
Following the Great Depression and the Stock Market Crash of 1929, Congress 
recognized the need for a strong federal regulator to oversee securities markets.37 In 
order to ensure investor confidence, while promoting open markets, fair 
transacting, and honest securities traders, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).38 The overarching 
intent of creating the SEC, and establishing federal regulations, was “to substitute a 
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to 
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”39 In order to 
hold securities traders accountable for any potential wrongdoing, and violation of 
the public trust, § 10(b) of the Act makes it “unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly,” to “use or employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may 
prescribe.”40  
1. To Enforce § 10(b) of the Act, the SEC Promulgated Rule 10b–5 
In pursuance of the Congressional delegation to the SEC in § 10(b), the SEC 
implemented Rule 10b–5 — the enforcement mechanism against “manipulative 
and deceptive devices” in the securities market.41 Mirroring the language of § 10(b), 
Rule 10b–5 states that:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange,  
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,  
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or,  
 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (discussing the need for federal regulation of security trading).  
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 78d.  
 39. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (emphasis in original).  
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).  
 41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5.  
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.42 
It is unclear from the exact language of Rule 10b–5 if private citizens, as investors, 
have standing or if enforcement is limited to actions brought by the SEC — 
requiring the Court to interpret the Congressional intent in passing § 10(b).43 
2. The Court Has Read a Private Right of Action Into § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5  
In Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,44 the Supreme Court 
read a private right of action into the language of Rule 10b–5.45 Acknowledging the 
lack of express direction from Congress, the Court asserted that the Act, and § 
10(b) in particular, are not limited to the goal of maintaining stable securities 
markets.46 Rather, the statute “must be read flexibly, not technically and 
restrictively” in order to provide private citizens a means of “redress under § 
10(b).”47  
B. Over Time, the Court Established the Requirements and Limitations of Who Can 
Sue Under the Implied Private Right of Action  
After establishing the private right of action, the Court began to limit the scope of 
the action.48 Doing this, according to the Court, was a necessary action to properly 
implement and enforce Congress’s intent in first enacting the Securities Exchange 
Act.49 However, in order to avoid frivolous suits, while maintaining investors’ access 
to judicial remedy, the Court has established a set of requirements a private 
plaintiff, or class thereof, must meet in order to bring a valid action.50 
 
 
 
 
 42. Id.  
 43. See infra Part II.A.2.  
 44. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).  
 45. Id. at 13 n.9. 
 46. Id. at 12.  
 47. Id.  
 48. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.  
 49. See, e.g., Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (“The securities statutes seek 
to maintain public confidence in the marketplace” by curbing misconduct “through the availability of private 
securities fraud actions”).  
 50. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.  
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1. The Court Has Adopted the Requirement of Materiality of Misstatements and an 
Investor’s Reliance in Order to Establish a Valid Claim  
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,51 the Court held that in order for a plaintiff to bring a valid 
securities fraud claim under § 10(b), the misstatements made must be of a material 
nature, and “[i]t is not enough that a statement is false or incomplete” if it “is 
otherwise insignificant.”52 To determine what is “material,” the Court adopted an 
ad hoc balancing test where it looks at facts unique to each situation — such as the 
likelihood a misstatement will impact investment decisions, and the overall 
ramifications of those decisions.53  
Additionally, the plaintiff must rely on the material misstatement.54 The Court 
has “found a rebuttable presumption of reliance in two different circumstances”55 
— if there is a material omission and an actor had a duty to disclose,56 or under the 
“fraud-on-the-market doctrine.”57 This doctrine adopts a theory that in an efficient 
market, the price of a security represents all publicly available information on the 
asset.58 Therefore, when an investor purchases a security, they do so based off of its 
price making it an attractive purchase; thereby necessarily creating reliance on the 
false statement or omission because that misconduct altered the security’s market 
price.59 Over time, the Court added further requirements in addition to materiality 
and reliance in order to make a valid § 10(b) claim of securities fraud.60  
2. The Court Has Established Six Elements for a Valid Rule 10b–5 Claim 
While the Court in Basic established a private right of action in securities fraud 
litigation to complement criminal and SEC enforcement suits,61 in order to avoid 
frivolous suits, it was necessary to judicially establish a complete set of 
 
 51. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  
 52. Id. at 238. 
 53. Id. (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[M]aterial[ity] … will 
depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the 
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.”)) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 54. Id. at 243.  
 55. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008).  
 56. Id. (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972)).  
 57. Id.  
 58. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See infra Part II.B.2.  
 61. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (“This Court has long 
recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential 
supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions. . .”).  
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requirements.62 Relying on case law, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act which requires plaintiffs in private securities actions to plead with 
“particularity” certain elements of a claim,63 in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo64 the Supreme Court outlined six elements plaintiffs must meet in order to 
have a valid securities fraud claim.65 Following Dura, in order for private plaintiffs 
to make a valid Rule 10b–5 claim, they must illustrate: (i) “a material 
misrepresentation (or omission),”66 (ii) a wrongful state of mind (“scienter”),67 (iii) 
a connection between the misrepresentation and the “purchase or sale of a 
security,”68 (iv) “reliance” on the misstatement,69 (v) “economic loss,”70 and (vi) the 
loss must be connected to the misstatement.71 In addition to the limitations 
imposed on plaintiffs with regard to how they must sue pursuant to § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b–5, the Court has also imposed limitations on who plaintiffs can sue.72  
 
 
 62. Id. (emphasizing the importance of “meritorious” suits); see also Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994) (discussing the negative economic consequences high 
levels of securities fraud litigation).  
 63. Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). In a 
standard private civil claim of action, a plaintiff’s complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”). However, in fraud actions, per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b), plaintiffs must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
9(b). Similarly, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) requires plaintiffs to plead “with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind” in 
committing the securities fraud. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2)(A).  
 64. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).  
 65. Id. at 341–42.  
 66. Id. at 341 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988)).  
 67. Id. (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197, 199 (1976)).  
 68. Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730–31 (1975)).  
 69. Id. 341–42 (2005) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248–49).  
 70. Id. at 342 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(4)).  
 71. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(4)). It should be noted, however, that there is currently disagreement 
as how to properly synthesize Dura’s elements with the requirements of the PSLRA; uncertainty remains as to 
which elements, if not all, must be plead with particularity. Compare Brief for Respondent at 54–55, Janus 
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) 
(asserting that scienter was the only element of a securities fraud claim a plaintiff must plead with particularity 
because the PSLRA only requires a “‘strong’ inference of scienter,” and courts are allowed to make inferences in 
“determining the sufficiency of pleadings as to the other elements”) (internal citations omitted), with Brief for 
Petitioner at 55, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09–525) 
(illustrating that since “[m]ental state is rarely susceptible to direct proof” Congress only intended to allow 
plaintiffs to plead with inferences to the element of scienter, but other elements “can be proved directly, and 
thus must be plead ‘with particularity’—not inferred”) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).  
 72. See infra Part II.C. 
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C. To Complement Strict Pleading Requirements for Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud 
Litigation, the Court Has also Limited the Scope of Potential Actions Creating a Private 
Right of Action Under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 
Just as the Court was reluctant to allow a broad right under a judicially established 
cause of action, the Court has also been reluctant to expose a large group of 
potential defendants to primary liability for securities fraud.73 To that end, in 
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,74 the Court 
limited those primarily liable in a private action for “mak[ing]” a false statement 
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 to those individuals or entities that actually made a 
material misstatement or omission, while denying a private cause of action against 
those who are secondarily liable for aiding or abetting the violator.75 Following the 
Court’s holding in Central Bank, Congress, in § 1014 of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended § 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 to limit aider and abettor (secondary) liability to enforcement actions brought 
by the SEC.76 
1. Non-Corporate “Insiders” per Central Bank are Not Necessarily “Outsiders” and 
Thus, Under the Right Circumstances, Can be Primarily Liable in a Rule 10b–5 Action  
Although Central Bank’s holding facially limits the types of actors who may be 
potentially liable under Rule 10b–5 to those inside, and working for, the 
corporation,77 the limitation it imposed was on the action not the actor.78 The Court 
in Central Bank explicitly stated: 
Any person or entity, including a[n outside] lawyer, accountant, or bank, 
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or 
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as 
a primary violator under 10b–5, assuming all of the [other] requirements 
for primary liability under Rule 10b–5 are met.79 
 
 73. See, e.g., Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) (“[W]e are 
mindful that we must give narrow dimensions . . . to a private right of action Congress did not authorize when 
it first enacted the statute.”) (citing Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148, 167 (2008)) (internal quotations omitted).  
 74. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 75. Id. at 180.  
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e). 
 77. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176 (asserting that Plaintiff’s improperly read the use of “indirectly” in 
Rule10b–5 as extending a private right of action against corporate outsiders).  
 78. Id. at 191.  
 79. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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This reasoning comports with earlier Court decisions that held that even if a 
contributor to a materially false statement was not named in the statement, they 
could still be held primarily liable under Rule 10b–5.80 And in interpreting Central 
Bank, lower federal courts similarly have held that individuals or institutions that 
do not themselves produce the misstatement can still be liable if they: produce 
documents that are used to create a misstatement and are then reproduced in the 
statement, prepare but do not sign the document, or use an innocent conduit to 
produce or issue the statement.81 However, in order to avoid overreach of holding 
corporate outsiders primarily liable under Rule 10b–5, in Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc.,82 it was necessary for the Court to elaborate 
on the reliance requirement.83 
2. In Stoneridge the Court Clarified the Requirement of Reliance for a Valid Rule 10b–
5 Claim  
Although Central Bank limited the private right of action to primary liability, in so 
doing the Court emphasized that under the right circumstances corporate outsiders 
could potentially be held primarily liable under Rule 10b–5, and lower federal 
courts have relied on Central Bank to extend primary liability in circumstances even 
where the maker of the statement is not facially responsible.84 Without limitations, 
this holding has the potential to create a broad right of action against corporate 
outsiders — thereby usurping the role of the SEC in bringing enforcement actions 
per § 20(a) of the Act. Therefore, in Stoneridge the Court clarified the division 
between those primarily liable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, and those that are 
only secondarily liable as an aider or abettor.85 In Stoneridge, the Court held that the 
 
 80. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Hudelston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n.22 (1983) (holding that corporate 
officers or outside advisers may be primarily liable even if “they are not named” in the statement); see also 
Anixter v. Home–Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225–27 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding outsider auditor 
primarily liable when opinion and certification letters were reproduced in a prospectus); McConville v. SEC, 
465 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding a Chief Financial Officer was primarily liable for drafting 
misstatements which were later reproduced in her company’s 10–K even though she did not sign or file the 
public statement); SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding an outsider consultant could 
be primarily liable for drafting statements later reviewed, certified, and published in a company’s filing 
statements). The extension of primary liability to secondary actors, however, is limited in scope — every 
element of the Rule 10b–5 element has to be met. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. There are numerous 
circumstances where secondary actors cannot be held liable. See Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 
1040, 1046 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that an outsider auditor could not be primarily liable for misconduct after 
the completion of the sale of the security); Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying 
primary liability of an auditor when the misstatements were not “attributed” to it); Ziemba v. Cascae Int’l, Inc., 
256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001) (same, actor was an outside law firm); Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 
476 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2007) (same, actor was an auditor). 
 81. See supra note 80.  
 82. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).  
 83. Id. at 152.  
 84. See supra Part II.C.1.  
 85. Stoneridge, 511 U.S. at 153.  
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supplier of a company who colluded with the corporation to cause it to mislead 
their outside auditor — resulting in fraudulent financial statements on which 
shareholders relied — could not be held primarily liable because the statements 
made by the supplier were not directly relied on by the investors.86 Thus, in 
Stoneridge, the Court did not expressly overrule Central Bank, but simply clarified 
that a corporate outsider may be only liable if the investor directly relies on their 
misstatement — thereby reiterating the distinction between primary and secondary 
liability, and the need to have a limited interpretation of the implied right of 
action.87  
3. Despite the Piecemeal Development of the Requirements for a Proper Rule 10b–5 
Cause of Action, Securities Fraud Litigation and Corporate Misconduct Have Persisted  
In spite of, or perhaps due to, the gradual development of an understanding of 
which actions, or actors, can be held primarily liable for securities fraud, ambiguity 
in the law has persisted.88 In response to this lack of clarity, corporate actors have 
continually found new ways to side step liability under Rule 10b–5.89 For these 
reasons, the Court continues to be called to clarify the scope and meaning of Rule 
10b–5 to best provide a remedy for securities fraud while avoiding judicial 
activism.90 Similarly, financial crises have forced Congress to redefine, and expand, 
securities laws to best ensure socially responsible corporate conduct — most 
recently with the holistic Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act.91 
 
 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. However, after Stoneridge, lower courts properly read the Court’s discussion of reliance to maintain 
the private right of action against outsiders discussed in Central Bank. See, e.g., SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 
1261 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding an outsider consultant could be primarily liable for drafting statements later 
reviewed, certified, and published in a company’s filing statements). 
 88. See infra Part IV.  
 89. See infra Part IV.  
 90. See infra Part IV.  
 91. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-664, SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY OF 
SECONDARY ACTORS 2, 6 (2011) (discussing, per Congressional order via Dodd-Frank, the potential advantages, 
and support for, amending securities fraud law to potentially hold secondary actors primarily liable); Liability 
for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (proposed bill which 
would extend a private right of action to aider and abettors); Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities 
Violations Act of 2010, H.R. 5042, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010) (same); see also Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming 
a Financial Regulatory Black Hold with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic Economic 
Destabilization Caused by an Unregulated Multi–Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 128 
(2011) (discussing how, “if properly implemented” the regulations proposed in Dodd-Frank would have the 
ability to minimize risk and improve corporate governance). But see, Stephen Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack 
Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 U. MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1783 (2010) (stating that both Sarbanes-
Oxley and Dodd-Frank are improper regulations of corporate governance and unjustified responses to anti-
corporate populism).  
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III. The Court’s Reasoning  
In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,92 the Supreme Court, in a 
five-to-four decision,93 held that JCM did not “make” the false statements in the 
Fund’s prospectuses, and therefore, could not be primarily liable for a fraud-on-
the-market claim under Rule 10b–5(b).94 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas 
held that in order to “make” a statement per Rule 10b–5(b) the entity must have 
“ultimate authority over the statement.”95 Here, Justice Thomas declared, because 
the Fund issued the prospectuses, the Fund had final control over the 
misstatements — causing the Fund, and not JCM, to be the only entity that had 
“authority over” it.96 Drawing a parallel to the relationship between a speechwriter 
and a speaker, Justice Thomas asserted that while an individual or entity might have 
a hand in shaping and drafting the message, the statements are only attributable to 
the speaker.97 
To support this analogy, Justice Thomas took a textual reading of Rule 10b–5(b) 
— declaring that while “make” itself can act as a verb when the action is directed at 
a noun “(e.g.: to make a chair),” in other contexts when “make” is paired with a 
noun which conveys its own action, “the resulting phrase is approximately 
equivalent in sense to that verb.”98 Thus, to “make a[] . . . statement” becomes 
equivalent to “to state.”99 Accordingly, Justice Thomas held that the language of 
Rule 10b–5(b) only extends liability to the person or entity that itself “states” the 
falsity, and, therefore, the Government’s assertion that “mak[ing]” should be 
equivalent to “creat[ing]” was too broad.100 Correspondingly, Justice Thomas also 
rejected First Derivative’s argument that the word “indirectly” in Rule 10b–5 
should modify “make” as it does not directly modify “make,” but rather all of the 
verbs in Rule 10b–5, including the actions in sub-sections 10b–5(a) and 10b–5(c) 
“to employ” and “to engage;” suggesting that “indirectly” refers to how the 
statement is conveyed to the public, not one’s role in issuing the statement.101 
This close reading, according to Justice Thomas, is in line with the Congressional 
intent in originally drafting the Securities Exchange Act, and its unwillingness to 
legislatively expand liability under Rule 10b–5, and the Court’s prior holding in 
 
 92. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).  
 93. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion of the Court; Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Alito joined; Justice Breyer wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Id. at 
2299.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 2302.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 2302–03 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).  
 99. Id. at 2302 (internal quotations omitted).  
 100. Id. at 2303–04 (internal citations omitted).  
 101. Id. at 2305 n.11 (internal quotations omitted).  
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Central Bank102 where it denied a private right of action to aiders and abettors.103 By 
limiting the actors potentially primarily liable in a private Rule 10b–5 action, Justice 
Thomas drew “a clean line” between those that can be held directly liable, and those 
who only aid and abet.104 Any broader reading, per Justice Thomas, would 
“undermine” this distinction in Central Bank and open the courts to private actions 
against any party who contributes to the making of a false statement — thereby 
creating a new right of action expressly denied by Congress when it limited control 
person liability to an action brought by the SEC.105 This reasoning, according to 
Justice Thomas, is consistent with the Court’s holding in Stoneridge because like the 
supplier in Stoneridge, JCM’s actions were not themselves public, but rather only 
contributed to public statements and were thus not directly relied upon by First 
Derivative.106 
In so holding, Justice Thomas rejected First Derivative’s claim that the 
overlapping relationship between an investment adviser and a mutual fund is 
unique and should cause JCM’s actions to extend beyond mere aiding and abetting 
— allowing JCM to be considered the direct actor — and “decline[d] this invitation 
to disregard the corporate form.”107 Justice Thomas illustrated that because the 
Fund was a legally separate entity from JCM, First Derivative’s reading would 
expand the scope of Rule 10b–5 liability that the Court expressly rejected in 
Stoneridge.108 Furthermore, Justice Thomas stated that “[a]ny reapportionment of 
liability in the securities industry,” given its unique nature, is a matter of legislation 
and reserved to Congress expressly.109 
Finding the majority’s interpretation of “make” to be too narrow, and an 
extension of the protection of liability granted in Central Bank, Justice Breyer, 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissented.110 According to 
Justice Breyer, the majority misinterpreted Central Bank’s protection of liability as 
excluding Rule 10b–5 liability for any separate legal entity by requiring 
“attribution” to a false statement made in a public document.111 This ruling, Justice 
Breyer asserted, improperly applied Central Bank, which was concerned with 
secondary liability, to a question of primary liability, and extended its protections; 
 
 102. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 103. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (2011); Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.  
 104. Janus Capital Group 131 S. Ct. at 2302 n.6.  
 105. Id. at 2302.  
 106. Id. at 2303. 
 107. Id. at 2304. 
 108. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (detailing the requirements of independence of a corporation’s board 
members)). Furthermore, Justice Thomas also noted that First Derivative failed to illustrate that any comments 
made by JCM to the Fund were “public statements” as required for a securities fraud violation. Id. at 2304 & n.9 
(citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227–28 (1988)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 2305–06 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 111. Id. at 2308 (internal citation omitted).  
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instead of “drawing a clean line,” the majority, in Justice Breyer’s view, expressly 
broadened liability protection to a situation the Court in Central Bank suggested 
would give rise to a private cause of action under Rule 10b–5.112 Here, Justice Breyer 
declared, JCM was directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the Fund and 
the relationship between the two entities “could hardly have been closer.”113 Thus, 
unless the Court incorrectly and “arbitrarily exclude[s] from the scope of the word 
‘make’ those who manage a firm,” per Justice Breyer’s opinion, management 
persons and entities should be held liable for misstatements issued themselves, or 
through an “unknowing intermediary” that they manage.114  
IV. Analysis  
The Court’s holding in Janus failed on three distinct levels, as it: misinterpreted 
existing case law, missed an opportunity to add nuance to the law, and ignored the 
implications of its holding which created a loophole for corporate actors to avoid 
(or attempt to avoid) securities fraud liability.115 In so doing, the Court expanded 
the limitations of Central Bank’s holding, failed to add nuance to the law to address 
the unique nature of mutual funds, while denying shareholders of JCG remedy and 
indirectly encouraged corporate misconduct at a time when increased corporate 
responsibility and responsiveness is crucial.116 In Janus the Court simultaneously 
failed to adhere to judicial restraint and acknowledge recent Congressional 
(in)action.117 Coming in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the Court’s 
holding in Janus improperly ignored the ramifications of its holding, and missed an 
opportunity to judicially create a catalyst for much needed corporate reform.118 
Furthermore, this holding highlights the modern Court’s unnecessarily pro-
corporate jurisprudence; in a series of cases, the Court has continuously preserved 
corporate immunity from liability, and denied individuals any legal remedy for 
corporate misconduct.119 
 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 2312  
 114. Id. Justice Breyer also found fault with the majority’s interpretation of Stoneridge — asserting that 
Stoneridge was a case concerning if investors relied on statements made, not which entity made a statement. Id. 
at 2308–09. Therefore, Justice Breyer found the majority’s reliance on Stoneridge to be misplaced, and 
inapposite to the facts of this case. Id. at 2309–10. Lastly, Justice Breyer also criticized the majority for its 
unwillingness to remand the case to allow First Derivative to amend their complaint to, as the majority suggests 
is a possibility, claim JCG and JCM could be liable in a § 20(a) aiding and abetting suit brought by the SEC. Id. 
at 2311 (internal cross reference omitted). 
 115. See infra Parts IV.A–C.  
 116. See infra Parts IV.A–C. 
 117. See infra Part IV.C.  
 118. See infra Part IV.C.  
 119. See infra Part IV.D. 
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A. The Court’s Holding Improperly Misapplied Case Law by Expanding the 
Limitations Central Bank Imposed  
In holding that JCM did not “make” the false statements in the Fund’s prospectus, 
the Court misinterpreted both Congress’s original intent in enacting the Securities 
Exchange Act, and the limitations Central Bank imposed.120 Vigilantly afraid of 
judicial overreach, Justice Thomas, in refusing to expand those potentially liable 
under Rule 10b–5, inadvertently expanded the Rule’s limitations and incorrectly 
applied Stoneridge to an inapplicable set of circumstances.121 On the surface, the 
Court merely reiterated prior case law when it held that “the maker of a statement 
is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its 
content and whether and how to communicate it.”122 However, this holding shifted 
the focus from action to the actor — thereby expanding the scope of actors 
protected from Rule 10b–5 liability.123  
1. Justice Thomas’s Textual Interpretation of Rule 10b–5 Contradicts the Legislative 
History of § 10(b) and the Context of Rule 10b–5 Promulgation which Requires a 
Flexible Reading  
The economic realities that gave rise to the enactment of the Securities Exchange 
Act, and promulgation of Rule 10b–5, closely mirror the current financial climate. 
As such, it would have been pertinent for the Court to take the recent financial 
collapse into consideration. The Act was created with the express purpose of 
ensuring fair and open securities markets.124 In order to maintain investor 
confidence, while encouraging investment activity, it was Congress’s express 
intention to avoid corporate misconduct and maintain a high standard of clear, 
recognizable, and responsive business principles.125 Therefore, in order to give the 
legislative intent full support to best apply the spirit of the law, the Court has 
continuously read § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 “not technically and restrictively” but 
“flexibly” to best apply its purpose.126 Indeed, implying the right of action is a 
 
 120. See infra Part IV.A.1.  
 121. See infra Part IV.A.2.  
 122. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).  
 123. See infra Part IV.A.2.  
 124. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (stating that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should 
be read liberally to best enforce the statute’s purpose).  
 125. See Brief for Respondent at 14, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (“Congress’s primary purposes in enacting the Exchange Act was to 
establish ‘honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence after the market crash of 1929’ 
and ‘to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high 
standard of business ethics in the securities industry.’”) (citing Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819) (emphasis in original) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 126. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). 
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perfect example of the Court’s liberal reading.127 The Court’s prior unwillingness to 
expand on that right was a necessary balance in order to avoid meritless lawsuits, 
however, the limitations imposed in Janus unjustly established an imbalance in 
securities fraud litigation by limiting the number of potentially liable primary 
violators.128 
By taking such a textual reading of Rule 10b–5, without consideration of the 
Rule’s purpose and legislative intent, or the Court’s instruction in SEC v. Zandford 
requiring a liberal reading (a unanimous opinion in which he participated), Justice 
Thomas improperly held that JCM could not be primarily liable for false statements 
made in the prospectus.129 In his strict interpretation of “make,” and closed reading 
of Central Bank and Stoneridge, Justice Thomas’s analysis was limited in scope.130 In 
holding that JCM did not “make” the false statements because it did not have 
“ultimate authority” over the statements, Justice Thomas focused solely on the fact 
that “corporate formalities were observed,”131 such as the fact that the Fund was the 
only entity to have the statutory duty to file the prospectuses with the SEC, in order 
to maintain JCM and the Fund as separate legal entities.132 Focusing on these 
technical formalities, without an analysis of the substance of the creation and 
dissemination of the misstatements, Justice Thomas improperly expanded the 
Court’s holding in Central Bank, and misapplied Stoneridge.133  
2. Justice Thomas’s Limited Interpretation of “[M]ake” and Inflexible Adherence to 
Corporate Technicalities Vastly Expanded Rule 10b–5 Liability Protections 
In the Court’s holding, Justice Thomas, in an attempt to adhere to Central Bank’s 
protection of aiders and abettors, inappropriately expanded that protection to 
primary violators.134 As previously mentioned, the Court in Central Bank expressly 
asserted that a corporate outsider could be held primarily liable provided all of the 
 
 127. See supra Part II.A.2.  
 128. See infra Part IV.A.2.  
 129. See infra Part IV.A.2.  
 130. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 131. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302, 2304 (2011) (internal 
quotations omitted). Justice Thomas relied on a select set of cases, and his analysis was primarily limited to a 
textual reading of Rule 10b–5. Id. at 2302. In so doing, Justice Thomas failed to consider the numerous cases, 
both before and after Central Bank and Stoneridge, where separate legal entities from the entity issuing the 
misstatement, or undisclosed individuals, could still be held liable. See supra note 80.  
 132. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304. 
 133. See id. at 2308 (“[D]epending upon the circumstances [under Central Bank], board members, senior 
firm officials, officials tasked to develop a marketing document, large investors, or others (taken together or 
separately) all might ‘make’ materially false statements subjecting themselves to primarily liability. The 
majority’s rule does not protect, it extends, Central Bank’s holding of no-liability into new territory that Central 
Bank explicitly placed outside that holding. And by ignoring the language in which Central Bank did so, the 
majority’s rule itself undermines Central Bank.”) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 134. Id. 
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six elements of a valid Rule 10b–5 claim are met.135 First Derivative made a valid 
claim: JCM (having total control over the Fund) caused prospectuses to be issued, 
which included the material misstatement that the Fund did not engage in market 
timing; JCM knowingly caused the misstatements to be issued; the misstatements 
made the mutual funds more marketable because of the risks market timing creates, 
which in turn made JCG a more attractive investment for members of First 
Derivative; First Derivative members relied on the misstatement in purchasing 
stock in JCG; shareholders of JCG lost money following the disclosure that JCM 
allowed market timing; and the loss was a result of the misstatements.136 No one, 
not even Justice Thomas, would conclude otherwise; in fact, Justice Thomas 
recognized the high level of control JCM had over the Fund by admitting in a 
footnote that it could, even under his narrow reading of § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, be 
held liable for “act[ing] through [an] innocent intermediar[y].”137 The holding of 
no liability per Rule 10b–5 is solely due to his limited interpretation of “make” and 
focus on corporate structure technicalities.138 However, as illustrated, this reading is 
in direct conflict with Central Bank.139 
JCM had total control of the production and distribution of the prospectuses, 
and directly caused the economic loss suffered by the plaintiffs.140 A mutual fund as 
an independent corporate entity is a legal fiction; they are a shell with all of their 
directors and officers wearing dual hats — serving the Fund while also serving 
either the parent company or the investment adviser.141 Thus, to limit the 
potentially liable actor to the entity with “ultimate control” in a mutual fund 
scenario denies investors the opportunity to sue anyone.142 Additionally, by 
asserting nothing on the prospectuses indicated that JCM in fact “ma[d]e” the 
misstatements, Justice Thomas failed to consider the fact that the “Janus” name is 
the property of JCG (and thus JCM as its wholly-owned subsidiary), and the Funds 
have been allowed to use the name in conducting business.143 This allowed Justice 
Thomas to declare, by citing Stoneridge, that the investors did not rely on JCM’s 
 
 135. See supra Part II.B.2.  
 136. See supra Part. I; see also Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting); In re Mutual Funds Inv. 
Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding First Derivative’s § 10(b) claim against JCM was sufficient to 
overcome the motion to dismiss). 
 137. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.10 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 2304 (majority opinion) (internal quotations omitted).  
 139. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  
 140. See supra Part I.  
 141. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Assocs. LP, 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that “mutual funds are ‘captives’ of investment advisers”); see also supra 
Part I.  
 142. See infra Part IV.C.1.  
 143. See Brief for Respondent at 4, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (“Janus entities engaged in a coordinated marketing strategy that 
blurred the distinction between the entities that constituted JCG’s business, so that investors perceived a unified 
Janus brand.”). 
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misstatements.144 However, provided the fact that JCM cannot be separated from 
the Fund, JCM had ultimate control over the day-to-day operations of the Fund, 
and the prospectuses were issued under the Janus name, the Fourth Circuit 
properly held that the investors did rely on the misstatements to purchase stock in 
JCG.145  
Based off of this holding, by construing such a limited reading of “make” in an 
attempt to stay true to the Court’s purpose in Central Bank to avoid excessive 
litigation, Justice Thomas improperly expanded its protections.146 The Court was 
right in Central Bank when it denied a private right of action for aiding and 
abetting.147 Accountants, lawyers, consultants, bankers, and financiers play a crucial 
role in our economic structure, and to hold such actors primarily liable in any 
securities fraud action — even if they themselves are not the primary violator — 
would both open the floodgates to litigation, and discourage smart and capable 
people from entering those professions.148 When outsiders play a direct role in the 
issuance of a misstatement or omission, the Court recognized in Central Bank the 
need to hold them primarily liable.149 However, Justice Thomas’s unwillingness to 
read “make” liberally unnecessarily expanded Central Bank’s protections to 
corporate outsiders even when they are primarily liable.150 Even if the Court’s 
interpretation and expansion of Central Bank is proper, an exception should be 
recognized in the mutual fund scenario.151 
B. Even Under the Court’s Rule of Who “[M]ake[s]” a Misstatement per Rule 10b–5, 
an Exception Should be Made for the Mutual Fund-Investment Adviser Relationship 
Provided the Interdependence Between the Two Entities  
The Court’s holding, by limiting the type of actors potentially liable under Rule 
10b–5, even if it were accepted as prudent in an average securities fraud situation, 
would still be improper when the misstatements are made by a mutual fund’s 
 
 144. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011).  
 145. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 146. See supra note 130.  
 147. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).  
 148. See id. at 189 (“[U]ncertainty and excessive litigation can have ripple effects. For example, newer and 
smaller companies may find it difficult to obtain advice from professionals . . . In addition, the increased costs 
incurred by professionals because of the litigation and settlement costs under 10b–5 may be passed on to their 
client companies, and in turn incurred by the company’s investors, the intended beneficiaries of the statute.”) 
(citing Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of 
Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 948–66 (1993)).  
 149. Id. at 191.  
 150. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2308 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  
 151. See Brief for Respondent at 21, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (discussing the close relationship between a mutual fund and its 
investment adviser should have guided the Court’s opinion).  
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investment adviser, because doing so effectively eliminates a private right of action 
in this scenario.152 As previously illustrated, JCG, JCM, and the Fund purposely held 
themselves out as one entity to the investing public.153 Additionally, all of the Fund’s 
directors and operators were from, and thus its day-to-day operations were 
controlled by, JCM; all seventeen of the Fund’s officers were Vice Presidents of 
JCM, the Fund’s General Counsel simultaneously served the same position for JCG 
and JCM, the Fund’s Chairman was the former CEO of JCG, and the primary 
revenue stream for JCG was JCM’s management of the Funds.154 This situation is 
not unique in the mutual fund market.155 Accordingly, even by accepting the 
Court’s interpretation of “make,” it should have created an exception for the 
mutual fund—investment adviser relationship.156 By not creating such an exception, 
in the average mutual fund securities fraud claim, the plaintiffs are denied the 
ability to seek judicial remedy against anyone; most mutual funds do not have 
directors, officers, or employees distinct from the investment adviser, yet remain a 
separate legal entity.157 Therefore, by focusing on the legal separateness of 
individuals and entities who issue statements, and not the substantive actions, in 
Janus the Court imprudently denied a private right of action in almost all mutual 
fund-related securities fraud claims, and gave corporations and corporate actors a 
roadmap as to how to avoid liability.158 In so doing, the Court not only missed an 
opportunity to curb corporate misconduct, but also expressly created a loophole in 
the law that will encourage it.159 
C. Janus Will Encourage Corporate Misconduct  
In holding that JCM could not be primarily liable for false statements made in the 
Fund’s prospectuses, not only did the Court deny the class members of First 
Derivative an opportunity to financially recover from their losses, but it also 
improperly provided corporations with a roadmap as to how to avoid liability.160 
For these reasons, the Court’s holding in Janus was a failure on both the micro and 
the macro level. The bright-line rule of what it means to “make” a statement for 
 
 152. Id.  
 153. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.  
 154. Brief for Respondent at 4, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) 
(No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari). 
 155. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.  
 156. See Brief for Respondent at 21, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (discussing how the close relationship between a mutual fund and 
its investment adviser should allow the Court to have found JCM liable under Rule 10b–5(b)). 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 30.  
 159. See infra Part IV.C. 
 160. See Brief for Respondent at 30, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (stating a finding that JCM could not be liable for “mak[ing]” a false 
statement “opens a roadmap for securities-fraud violators”). 
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purposes of Rule 10b–5 was improper, and will have, absent Congressional action 
to amend the Securities Exchange Act, strong negative reverberations in the 
corporate world.161  
1. Justice Thomas’s Reasoning, by Emphasizing the Corporate Form, Created a 
Loophole in Federal Securities Law 
By emphasizing that: (i) JCM was a separate legal entity; (ii) it followed corporate 
formalities; and (iii) the Fund, not JCM, distributed the prospectuses, Justice 
Thomas injudiciously focused on the form of transactions, and not the substance.162 
In so doing, the Court provided corporations with a step-by-step plan as to how to 
avoid liability: create a legally separate corporation, trust, or other business entity; 
funnel all misstatements or omissions though it; and therefore avoid liability.163 
Regardless of the fact that the separate entity would be a shell — having no 
independent directors, officers, or employees of its own — it, per the holding in 
Janus, would be the only entity potentially liable for securities fraud.164 Based on his 
holding, it would appear, that if Justice Thomas were to watch The Wizard of Oz, he 
would in fact “pay no attention to that man behind the curtain” and attribute all of 
the statements completely to the fictional image with absolute disregard to the 
person giving it life and controlling its every move.165 By focusing on corporate form 
and ignoring the substance of the transactions, Justice Thomas improperly held that 
the only entity that could be liable in this case, and in likely future cases, is a shell 
firm with no actual independent agents or other actors, and not the individuals who 
are actually doing all of the work.166 
This limited reading of Rule 10b–5 not only denies investors the ability to seek 
judicial remedy in a private right of action, but it also makes it more difficult for the 
SEC to bring enforcement actions against aiders and abettors pursuant to § 20(e) of 
the Securities Exchange Act.167 In order for one to aid or abet, there must be an 
 
 161. Id.  
 162. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011).  
 163. See id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I can find nothing in § 10(b) or in Rule 10b–5, its language, its 
history, or in precedent suggesting that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, intended a loophole of the 
kind that the majority’s rule may well create.”); see also Scott Lemieux, The Right to Double Speak, AMERICAN 
PROSPECT (July 14, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/right-double-speak (“The Court's opinion provides a 
blueprint for executives of financial firms who want to profit from defrauding their customers: Just form a 
subsidiary your company runs, and you can't be held responsible for lying to the customers who choose to do 
business with you.”).  
 164. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 165. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).  
 166. See supra notes 162, 165 and accompanying text.  
 167. See Brief for Respondent at 30, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (“Nor is it clear that the SEC could bring an enforcement action on 
an aiding-and-abetting theory against an entity that creates and disseminates misstatements issued in another 
entity’s name.”).  
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actor, or actors, who the aider aids.168 If a shell corporation issues a statement, but 
itself has no independent agents, there can be no identifiable primary violator of a 
securities fraud.169 Thus, even though Justice Breyer was correct in his dissent, given 
Justice Thomas’s suggestion that JCM could still be held potentially liable as a 
secondary actor, that the Court should have remanded on this issue,170 it is likely 
that a lower court would not be able to find JCM secondarily liable using Justice 
Thomas’s reasoning.171 Because the Fund itself is the actor, JCM is the aider, and the 
Fund does not have any agents independent of JCM, under Justice Thomas’s 
holding, the actor and the aider are one in the same — they would be assisting 
themselves.172 Therefore, if one cannot be primarily liable as an actor, the same 
individual cannot logically be held secondarily liable as an aider or abettor.173 The 
Court’s holding in Janus, for these reasons, directly created a loophole in securities 
fraud litigation that, as discussed below, has and will encourage corporate 
misconduct.174  
Nor was Justice Thomas willing to nuance his holding to recognize an exception 
for the relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser.175 This 
relationship truly is, to borrow from the gatekeeper of Emerald City, “a horse of a 
different color” and the law should reflect this difference.176 JCM, like most other 
investment advisers to mutual funds, controlled all of the Fund’s actions; the two 
entities cannot be separate from each other.177 Therefore, the loophole only gets 
larger, and liability easier to avoid, with respect to mutual funds.178 
2. Janus Has Stalled Much Needed Corporate Reform Because the Loophole it Creates 
Has Encouraged Corporate Misconduct, and its Reasoning Fails to Recognize 
Congress’s Attempted Reforms 
Although Justice Thomas was attempting to avoid judicial overreach and prevent a 
rise in securities fraud litigation,179 his holding has encouraged corporate 
 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2311 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  
 171. Brief for Respondent at 30, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari). 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. See infra Part IV.C.2.  
 175. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011) (majority opinion).  
 176. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).  
 177. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 178. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the interconnectedness of mutual funds and 
their investment advisers). 
 179. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 (majority opinion). 
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misconduct.180 This has caused lower federal courts in the aftermath of Janus to try 
and reconcile the Court’s interpretation of Rule 10b–5 with the spirit of regulation, 
and the need to hold those who commit securities fraud primarily liable in a private 
right of action.181 This reading is not only bad policy, but was also a missed 
opportunity to judicially complement Congressional actions such as the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.182 While Justice Thomas’s 
unwillingness to act absent Congressional action, and strict adherence to the 
separation of powers,183 is respectable, it was misguided.184 Congress’s failure to act is 
not an example of its unwillingness to act.185 In fact, Congress — both individual 
members and the institution itself — have attempted to act to address 
shortcomings in securities fraud law.186 By not recognizing Congress’s attempt to 
reform federal securities law, while misinterpreting Central Bank, the Court in 
Janus missed an opportunity to spur corporate reform.187  
The Court’s holding in Janus improperly extended Central Bank and now allows 
for outsiders or secondary actors of the corporation in question, even when they are 
the primary actor causing the misstatement or omission, to be protected from 
liability because they do not technically have “ultimate control” over the 
statements.188 This reasoning has caused numerous defendants in later cases to 
utilize the loophole created in Janus, by arguing that the logic of the opinion 
extends to protect corporate insiders from personal liability when they engage in 
misconduct because they themselves did not “make” a statement — forcing lower 
federal courts to develop a nuanced reading of Justice Thomas’s black-and-white 
opinion to prevent total elimination of the concept of agency.189 Some of this 
misconduct is clearly inapposite to the facts of Janus — such as in Securities & 
Exchange Commission v. Das where two Chief Financial Officers attempted to claim 
that Janus protected them from misstatements made in their corporation’s financial 
statements — however, the fact that defendants in these cases even improperly 
 
 180. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.  
 181. See, e.g., SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787, at *6 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2011) (agent of a 
corporation improperly relying on Janus to try to avoid liability for a misstatement issued by the corporation); 
In re Merck & Co., Inc. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, Nos. 05–1151, 05–2367, 2011 WL 3444199, at 
*24 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011) (same); see also, e.g., Hawaii Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 
3:10CV371, 2011 WL 3862206, at *4 (D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011) (discussing the confusion if Janus’s holding 
extends to protecting corporate insiders without final control over issuance of a fraudulent statement). 
 182. Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).  
 183. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011) (stating that “[a]ny 
reapportionment of liability … is properly the responsibility of Congress and not the courts”).  
 184. See infra notes 192–202 and accompanying text. 
 185. See infra notes 192–202 and accompanying text. 
 186. See infra notes 192–202 and accompanying text.  
 187. See infra notes 192–202 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra note 130–33 and accompanying text.  
 189. See supra note 183.  
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relied on Janus illustrate the exact shortcomings of the Court’s reasoning.190 
Corporations will likely rely on Janus as a defense as they continue to engage in 
misconduct.191  
As opposed to a judicial decision that would have reined in corporate 
misconduct, the Court’s holding in Janus essentially encourages corporations to act 
improperly.192 This reality is in direct conflict with the dire need for increased 
corporate responsibility in the wake of the financial crisis; holding JCM liable, or at 
least avoiding the creation of a loophole in federal securities laws, would have been 
a perfect judicial complement to Dodd-Frank.193 By finding JCM primarily liable, 
corporate actors, fearing they too would be found liable, would have increased their 
oversight and internal operations so as to comply with implicitly stronger federal 
securities laws.194  
Justice Thomas was unwilling to act absent direction from Congress.195 However, 
Justice Thomas failed to recognize that Congress has expressly attempted to refine 
and modernize federal securities laws as part of Dodd-Frank.196 A provision of 
Dodd-Frank required the Government Accountability Office to conduct a study on 
the effects of a potential extension of a private right of action against aiders and 
abettors.197 The study was inconclusive on the issue.198 Similarly, in 2009, 
 
 190. SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787, at *6 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2011); see also supra note 183 
and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 165, 183 and accompanying text.  
 192. See Editorial, So No One’s Responsible? If Mutual Funds Want to Lie, the Supreme Court's Conservatives 
Have Given Them a Way to Do It, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at A26 (discussing how the Court’s decision makes 
it “much harder for private law suits to succeed against mutual fund malefactors, even when they have admitted 
to lying and cheating”); Chuck Jaffee, Supreme Court Leaves Fund Investors Hanging, WALL ST. J. 
MARKETWATCH (June 19, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/supreme-court-leaves-fund-investors-
hanging-2011-06-19?dist=countdown (stating that if a parent company is not held liable for misstatements 
made by a subsidiary, then “there’s no telling what they might think they can get away with someday”); Scott 
Lemieux, The Right to Double Speak, AMERICAN PROSPECT (July 14, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/right-
double-speak (discussing how the Court’s focus on the corporate form may have negative ramifications in the 
initial public offering market, and the long-run negative consequences of initially over-valued start-up 
corporations).  
 193. Cf. Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A 
Morality Tale for Policy Makers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 312 (2005) (analyzing the historical development 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the lessons from the legislation stressing the importance of continual 
reconsideration of financial legislation and regulation in light of case law development); see also Catherine 
Shakespeare, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Assessing Its Impact, Charting Its Future, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 333, 
355 (2008) (stating that “[Sarbanes-Oxley] has restored investor confidence in the U.S. capital markets”); see 
also supra note 91.  
 194. See supra note 193.  
 195. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011).  
 196. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 929Z (2010) 
(directing the Comptroller General of the United States to “conduct a study on the impact of authorizing a 
private right of action against any person who aid or abets another person in violation of the securities laws”).  
 197. Id.  
 198. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-664, SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY OF SECONDARY 
ACTORS 45 (2011). 
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Pennsylvania Democratic Senator Arlen Specter introduced S. 1551, the “Liability 
for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009.”199 The act would amend 
§ 20(e) to allow for private rights of actions against aiders and abettors.200 Although 
the study illustrated the uncertainties of creating a private right of action against 
secondary actors,201 and the bill never made it out of committee,202 both are 
reflective of the need, and desire of the American public, to increase corporate 
governance oversight.203 Justice Thomas not only failed to recognize Congress’s 
actions, or attempted actions,204 in doing so he judicially established a new rule for 
securities fraud that is completely antithetical to the directions from Congress, the 
spirit of the Securities Exchange Act,205 and the economy’s current needs.206 Because 
of Janus, corporate misconduct will likely increase, and the needed reform in 
corporate governance is now that much more unobtainable.207 
D. The Court’s Holding in Janus Reflects a Pro-Corporate Jurisprudence by the Roberts 
Court to the Detriment of Investors, Consumers, and Employees  
The Roberts Court’s willingness to interpret laws to promote the interests of 
corporations, and shield them from liability, is not limited to Janus, or even 
securities law.208 Denying First Derivative a right of action is but one example of the 
current Court’s jurisprudence that is dedicated to promoting the rights and 
interests of corporations, while simultaneously limiting individual investors (both 
financial and political), consumers, and employees access to judicial remedy, and 
their role in our economic and political processes. 209 In an array of cases — 
involving such diverse issues as the proper scope of the First Amendment,210 federal 
pre-emption,211 and establishment of commonality in Class Action certifications212 
— the current Court has fervently promoted the rights of corporations to the 
 
 199. Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).  
 200. Id. Congresswoman Maxine Waters introduced a complementary bill in the House of Representatives. 
Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2010, H.R. 5042, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).  
 201. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-664, SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY OF SECONDARY 
ACTORS 45 (2011). 
 202. Bill Summary and Status, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN01551:@@@L&summ2=m&.  
 203. See supra note 193. 
 204. See supra note 193–200 and accompanying text.  
 205. See supra Part IV.A.1.  
 206. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.  
 207. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.  
 208. See infra Parts IV.D.1–3.  
 209. See infra Parts IV.D.1–3. 
 210. See infra Part IV.D.1. 
 211. See infra Parts IV.D.2.b–c.i. 
 212. See infra Part IV.D.3.  
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detriment of individual citizens.213 These holdings represent the Court’s consistent 
inattention to needed corporate governance reform, while drastically expanding 
protections for corporate entities.214 In Janus and its analogous cases, the Court has 
adopted a clear-cut answer, with limited room for nuance: corporations win, 
individuals lose.215 Both collectively and individually, these cases will have long-term 
negative reverberations in legal, economic, and political spheres.216  
1. In Janus the Court Limited the Scope of Rule 10b–5, While in Other Cases they Have 
Broadened the Scope of the First Amendment — Benefiting Corporations Over 
Individual Financial and Political Investors  
In Citizen United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court held the Bipartisan 
Campaign Finance Reform Act, which placed limits on corporate campaigns 
expenditures, to violate the First Amendment.217 Per Justice Kennedy, the Court 
held that a limitation on political expenditures was suppression of an entity’s 
freedom of speech under the First Amendment,218 and such limitations are only 
justified when they are, or have the appearance of, corruption.219 And an 
independent expenditure, because it is technically unassociated with any political 
campaign, cannot lead to corruption or its appearance; only a quid pro quo bribe, 
according to the Court, constitutes corruption in political campaigns.220 As such, the 
right of both not-for and for-profit entities to make independent political 
expenditures supporting or opposing candidates for elected office is now totally 
unencumbered221 — necessarily allowing a select group of individual donors and 
corporate actors to spend millions of dollars and single-handedly control, or at least 
influence, the outcome of political campaigns.222 
 
 213. See infra Parts IV.D.1–3.  
 214. See infra Parts IV.D.1–3.  
 215. See supra Parts IV.A–C; infra Parts IV.D.1–3.  
 216. See supra Parts IV.A–C; infra Parts IV.D.1–3. 
 217. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (“The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical 
distinction based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political speech.”).  
 218. Id. (holding that “restrictions on corporate independent expenditures are therefore [an] invalid” 
restriction on political speech).  
 219. Id. at 908–09. The Court reaffirmed that the Court in Buckely v. Valeo properly “sustained limits on 
direct contributions in order to ensure against the reality or appearance of corruption” because “direct 
contributions” have the ability to create improper “quid pro quo corruption.” Id. at 908 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)). However, the limitations imposed on independent expenditures in the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act were too distinct to “lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption,” and 
“[t]he fact that [corporate] speakers [making independent expenditures] may have influence over or access to 
elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt” or such expenditures do not lead to corruption. 
Id. at 910 (internal citations omitted).  
 220. Id. at 910.  
 221. Id.  
 222. See infra notes 225–26 and accompanying text.  
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In Janus the Court failed to acknowledge that corporations cannot be separated 
from the people that run them;223 in Citizens United it failed to acknowledge that 
corporations are not people.224 Each case emphasizes the form of a dynamic, while 
failing to understand the substance. By treating corporations as individual citizens, 
and grating them the uninhibited right to making expenditures, the Court 
completely restructured the American political process, and granted corporate 
entities an even greater voice in our elections.225 Now, with the ability to freely 
express a political position, and spend millions of dollars to ensure that that 
position is heard, corporate actors are able to influence the outcome of an election, 
as well as legislative activity.226 Just as Janus shields corporations from liability and 
limits the rights of individual investors,227 Citizens United promotes the control 
corporations have in our political process, while minimizing the voice of individual 
citizens.228 Janus will deny financial investors a right to remedy following corporate 
misconduct;229 Citizens United will effectively deny investors in our political process 
the right to remedy of electing new officials, or influencing policy, because they will 
necessarily be outspent by corporate entities.230 Furthermore, the Court has opened 
the door to political corruption and corporate misconduct as corporations freely 
spend money promoting, and candidates willingly endorse, agendas benefiting 
corporations to the detriment of individuals.231 
Following Citizens United, there has been widespread opposition to the Court’s 
holding — both as a matter of jurisprudence, 232 and because of its consequences on 
our political process.233 This opposition includes legislation on the state level to 
 
 223. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.  
 224. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.  
 225. See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day Prisoner’s Dilemma, 47 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2010) (discussing how the Court’s ruling in Citizens United will increase the 
incentive of corporations “to participate in politics via their checkbooks” which, in turn, will increase the costs 
of such political participation).  
 226. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (2010) (“Corporations, that is, are uniquely equipped to seek laws 
that favor their owners, not simply because they have a lot of money but because of their legal and 
organizational structure. Remove all restrictions on their electioneering, and the door may be opened to a type 
of rent seeking that is ‘far more destructive’ than what noncorporations are capable of.”). 
 227. See supra Parts IV.A–C.  
 228. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.  
 229. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.  
 230. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.  
 231. See Tucker, supra note 225, at 1106 (discussing the increased corporate political participation due to 
Citizens United); see also supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 232. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 
485, 497 (2012) (stating that the majority’s reasoning is contrary to their stated positions of judicial restraint 
and originalism, and instead is a form of “selective judicial activism”) (emphasis in original).  
 233. See, e.g., Taking Back our Democracy: Responding to Citizens United and the Rise of Super PACs: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., 
112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Lawrence Lessig, Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership, Harvard 
Law School) (discussing how the Court’s ruling in Citizens United has concentrated the political power and 
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limit,234 and federal level to overturn, the Court’s holding.235 Despite this backlash, 
however, the Court continues to ignore the realities of the negative implications of 
its Citizens United holding, and in fact further strengthen its pro-corporate 
campaign expenditure jurisprudence.236  
In Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, the Court overturned an Arizona law 
that provided publicly funded candidates matching funds when they ran against 
privately funded candidates to level the playing field and ensure a fair election.237 
Per Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held, using parallel logic to Citizens United, 
Arizona’s matching fund scheme violated the First Amendment by limiting the 
ability (or desire) of citizens to make political contributions and engage in the 
debate.238 In so holding, the Court strengthened Citizens United by ensuring the 
power of a limited number of corporations and individuals to control elections.239 
 
influence in the country in a minute portion of the population, and the anti-corruption opposition that has 
arisen in response).  
 234. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.  
 235. S.J. Res. 29, 112th Cong. (2011) (granting Congress, and the individual states, the right to regulate 
campaign fundraising and spending). Four parallel pieces of legislation were introduced in the House of 
Representatives — each proposing an amendment to the Constitution which would allow Congress to control 
campaign finance, and limit the power of corporations to control political elections. H.R.J. Res. 6 112th Cong. 
(2011) (amending the First Amendment to not extend freedom of speech protection to “any corporation, 
partnership, business trust, association, or other business organization with respect to the making of 
contributions, expenditures, or other disbursements of funds in connection with public elections,” and granting 
Congress and the states to make laws to regulate and enforce this provision); H.R.J. Res. 7 112th Cong. (2011) 
(same, but no language granting Congress or the states enforcement power); H.R.J. Res. 8 112th Cong. (2011) 
(granting Congress and the states the power to limit and regulate campaign contributions); H.R.J. Res. 86 112th 
Cong. (2011) (same). President Obama expressed his support of an amendment to the Constitution that would 
overturn the Court’s ruling in Citizens United. Bryon Tau, Obama Calls for Constitutional Amendment to 
Overturn Citizens United, POLITICO, Aug. 29, 2012, http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/08/obama-calls-
for-constitutional-amendment-to-overturn-133724.html ("Over the longer term, I think we need to seriously 
consider mobilizing a constitutional amendment process to overturn Citizens United (assuming the Supreme 
Court doesn't revisit it). Even if the amendment process falls short, it can shine a spotlight of the super-PAC 
phenomenon and help apply pressure for change.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
 236. See infra notes 237–243 and accompanying text.  
 237. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011).  
 238. Id. at 2818 (“Once a privately financed candidate has raised or spent more than the State's initial grant 
to a publicly financed candidate, each personal dollar spent by the privately financed candidate results in an 
award of almost one additional dollar to his opponent. That plainly forces the privately financed candidate to 
shoulder a special and potentially significant burden when choosing to exercise his First Amendment right to 
spend funds on behalf of his candidacy.”) (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted).  
 239. See id. at 2835 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“So to invalidate a statute that restricts no one's speech and 
discriminates against no idea—that only provides more voices, wider discussion, and greater competition in 
elections—is to undermine, rather than to enforce, the First Amendment.”). Justice Kagan, along with Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, dissented from the majority, and asserted that the Arizona law promoted free 
speech by subsidizing candidates to guarantee that their voice is heard. Id. at 2812, 2835. Subsidization, 
according to the dissenting justices, never limited speech because the provision merely gave others the ability to 
speak, but did not limit the rights of speakers. Id. Thus, the petitioner’s argument, Justice Kagan illustrated, was 
a rather novel one: their right to free speech was violated because another individual’s right to free speech was 
protected. Id. This, to Justice Kagan, and the author, is what one “might call [] chutzpah.” Id. (emphasis in 
original); MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 206 (10th ed. 1996) (defining “chutzpah” as Yiddish 
for “supreme self-confidence,” “nerve,” or “gall”).  
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Similarly, much like Justice Thomas was unwilling to develop a nuanced reading of 
Rule 10b–5 in Janus,240 so too was the Court unwilling to limit its holding in Citizens 
United this past summer when it summarily reversed a decision of the Montana 
Supreme Court.241 Montana passed a law in the aftermath of Citizens United that 
limited the ability of corporations to make political expenditures on state 
campaigns given the corruption they created.242 In American Tradition Partnership, 
Inc. v. Bullock, the Court, in a matter of eight sentences, invalidated Montana’s law 
without even hearing the merits of the case, and held that Citizens United applied to 
state elections.243 This holding, and the Court’s reluctance to nuance its 
jurisprudence, reaffirms its commitment to protecting corporations to the 
detriment of individuals.244 In so doing, the Court has left the American people with 
only one remedy: a constitutional amendment establishing that corporations are 
not individuals subject to the First Amendment.245 Because of the difficulty of 
amending the Constitution, this remedy will likely prove to be impractical246 — 
further creating opportunities for corporate misconduct, while denying individuals 
a meaningful ability to participate in the political process.247  
2. The Court’s Protection of Consumers over Individuals Has Denied Proper Consumer 
Protections  
Cases such as Janus and Citizens United limit the ability of individual investors to 
have significant control or contribution in our financial and political systems.248 
However, the Court’s jurisprudence protecting and promoting corporations is not 
limited to denying the rights of investors — people who make the conscious 
 
 240. See supra Part IV.B.  
 241. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam). 
 242. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011), invalidated by Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2490 (per 
curiam).  
 243. Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491 (“The question presented in this case is whether the holding of 
Citizens United applies to the Montana state law. There can be no serious doubt that it does.”) (citing U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.). Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented — stating 
that they ideally would grant certiorari to “reconsider Citizens United,” however, “given the Court's per curiam 
disposition” they “vote[d] instead to deny the petition.” Id. at 2492.  
 244. See Rachael Weiner, Supreme Court’s Montana Decision Strengthens Citizens United, WASH. POST BLOG 
(June 25, 2012, 10:43 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/supreme-courts-montana-
decision-strengthens-citizens-united/2012/06/25/gJQA8Vln1V_blog.html (quoting Sen. Charles Schumer as 
saying that the Court’s holding, “[f]or apparently political reasons[,] . . . further tipp[ed] the balance of power 
in America in favor of deep-pocketed, outside [corporate] interests.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 245. For recent legislative action addressing this remedy, see supra note 235.  
 246. Amending the Constitution requires a proposal by either two-thirds of all Senators and 
Representatives, or, two-thirds of all state legislatures calling for a “Convention for proposing amendments,” as 
well as ratification of the proposed amendment by three-fourths of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V, § 1.  
 247. See supra notes 226 and accompanying text.  
 248. See supra Parts IV.C–D.1.  
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decision to contribute.249 Instead, the Court’s pro-business holdings also limit the 
rights of consumers.250 In a series of cases, the Roberts Court has: protected the 
ability of wholesale distributors to control retail prices,251 allowed corporations to 
impose contract terms which make consumer recovery impractical,252 shielded 
generic drug companies from liability,253 and limited the ability of Congress to 
regulate commercial activity to best promote socially responsible corporations.254 
Each holding poses its own unique detriment to consumers, and, when viewed 
collectively, are illustrative of the current Court’s pro-business jurisprudence and 
its negative economic and political consequences.255 
a. The Roberts Court Overturned Nearly a Century of Precedent to Make it Easier for 
Corporations to Control and Maintain High Retail Prices 
Manufacturers and wholesale distributors of goods necessarily have a tremendous 
amount of control over distribution, and therefore, ultimate consumption of their 
products.256 An historic limitation on that control, however, was the per se illegality 
of vertical price controls under § 1 of the Sherman Act as established in 1911 by the 
Supreme Court in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.257 Under Dr. 
Miles, a contract between a manufacturer and retailer to set a minimum price for 
the manufacturer’s product (known as “resale price maintenance” or “RPM”) was 
prima facie anticompetitive, and an antitrust violation because “their sole purpose 
[is] the destruction of competition and fixing of prices.”258 Despite nearly 100 years 
of continued business reliance on the Court’s holding in Dr. Miles, the Supreme 
Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. overturned Dr. Miles 
and established a rule of reason analysis for vertical price restraints.259  
By adopting a rule of reason analysis for RPM, the Roberts Court has made it 
easier for large corporations to control the channels of distribution, set prices 
without downstream integration, and assure themselves steadier profits by limiting 
the power of discount retailers to provide consumers with quality products at 
 
 249. See infra Parts IV.D.2.a–c.  
 250. See infra Parts IV.D.2.a–c.  
 251. See infra Part IV.D.2.a.  
 252. See infra Part IV.D.2.b.  
 253. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.i.  
 254. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.ii.  
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affordable prices.260 The potential benefit of preventing free riders — something 
Justice Breyer recognized as limited in his dissent — does not outweigh the 
practical costs of consolidating the retail markets to the select group of 
manufacturer-approved retailers, and guaranteeing a higher price for consumers.261 
The long-term consequences of Leegin may indeed be muted when compared to 
other pro-corporate decisions because some RPM schemes may still be held to 
violate the Sherman Act.262 Nevertheless, it remains yet another example of the 
Modern Court’s pro-corporate jurisprudence.  
Just as Janus illogically denied investors a right of action following corporate 
misconduct,263 and Citizens United has granted corporations a greater voice in our 
political process,264 Leegin has limited the power of the consumer.265 In Leegin the 
Court held that RPM could spur competition between retailers for manufacturers’ 
contracts.266 However, retailers should compete for customers, not exclusive dealing 
rights; being an exclusive dealer is worthless unless the retailer has customers who 
can afford it.267 By granting manufacturers the ability to fix prices, and ignoring the 
need to compete for customers by offering lower prices, the Court in Leegin 
provided corporations greater control in the marketplace, and greater protection 
from antitrust violations — necessarily increasing their ability to influence market 
supply, while exposing consumers to higher prices.268 Such protection, and 
enhancement, of corporate bargaining power against consumers was again 
exemplified in the Court denying California the ability to protect its consumers 
against unconscionable adhesion contracts in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.269  
 
 260. See id. at 929 (“[One] safe prediction[] to make about today's decision [is] that it will likely raise the 
price of goods at retail.”).  
 261. Id. at 916 (“All this is to say that the ultimate question is not whether, but how much, ‘free riding’ of 
this sort takes place. And, after reading the briefs, I must answer that question with an uncertain ‘sometimes.’”) 
(emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).  
 262. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882 (“We now hold that Dr. Miles should be overruled and that [the illegality 
of] vertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason.”). In fact, since Leegin, plaintiffs have been 
successful in bringing claims of unlawful RPM under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Service, 
Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 226 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that agreements not to compete between 
Mack truck dealers had anticompetitive effects, and therefore, violated the Sherman Act).  
 263. See supra Part IV.A.2.  
 264. See supra Part IV.D.1. 
 265. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.  
 266. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890–91 (discussing how “[a]bsent vertical price restraints . . . discounting retailers 
can free ride on retailers who furnish services and then capture some of the increased demand those services 
generate” and the benefit of RPM to “increase interbrand competition by facilitating market entry for new firms 
and brands”).  
 267. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumer Fed’n of Am. As Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5, 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480) (“In assuming that the 
retail sector is a mere conduit exhibiting atomistic competition, [petitioners] overlook the robust contribution 
that intertype competition has played in the development of the American economy.”).  
 268. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.  
 269. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2012); see infra Part IV.D.2.b.  
Zachary K. Ostro 
Vol. 8, No. 1 2013 305 
b. The Court Has Protected and Promoted Highly Restrictive Consumer Contracts by 
Making Small Claims Recovery Uneconomical  
Given the size disparity between individual consumers and business entities, 
contracts of adhesion for commercial products are inevitable; producers sell a 
uniform product, and it is impractical for corporations to draft a new contract for 
each customer.270 However, contracts of adhesion create an inherent risk of the 
entity with significantly greater bargaining power to impose unconscionable clauses 
on the customer.271 Therefore, in order to avoid blatant customer mistreatment, and 
abusive contracts, it is the duty of courts to void such contracts as unenforceable.272 
The California Supreme Court attempted to do this in Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court when it held that class waivers in consumer arbitration agreements were 
unconscionable in adhesion contracts.273 However, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, the Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia, held the restriction to be pre-
empted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) because it violated a “liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration.”274  
In abrogating the Discover Bank rule, the Supreme Court established an 
interpretation of the FAA that protects corporations from paying claims against 
aggrieved customers, and, illogically, will discourage small claims arbitration.275 
Many retail arbitration claims are minimal, and, without the ability to aggregate 
claims in class arbitration, such consumers will likely make the decision to not 
pursue the claim provided the low payout and high costs.276 By making it 
uneconomical for consumers to individually arbitrate a claim, along with the high 
costs and time associated with litigation, consumers are left without a practical 
remedy, while corporations are free from payment.277 Furthermore, while the FAA 
was written with the express purpose of promoting arbitration, it expressly voids 
highly restrictive agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
 
 270. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 25 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).  
 271. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 557 (3d ed. 2004) (“Dangers are inherent in standardization . . 
. for it affords a means by which one party may impose terms on another unwitting or even unwilling party.”).  
 272. See, e.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 2–7 (4th ed.) (2010) (“[W]hile 
freedom of contract has been regarded as part of the common-law heritage so that absent an invalidating cause 
such as mistake, fraud, or duress, parties who make a contract are bound to it even though the contract may be 
unwise and even foolish, courts of equity have often refused to enforce some agreements when, in their sound 
discretion, the agreements have been deemed unconscionable.”). 
 273. 113 P.3d 1100, 153 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 
(2012).  
 274. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (internal citations omitted). Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan dissented — stating that the Discover Bank rule did not discourage arbitration, because its purpose was 
“with the scope of the [FAA]’s exception” for unconscionable contracts. Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 275. Id. at 1761 (stating that in cases involving small claims, a denial of class arbitration will “have the effect 
of depriving claimants of their claims”) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 276. Id. (“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the 
possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”). 
 277. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
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revocation of any contract.”278 By limiting the right of California to define what 
constitutes unconscionable contract clauses — a matter of common law 
traditionally left to the states — the Court’s holding in Concepcion denied 
California the ability to protect its consumers.279 This holding will prevent states 
from pursuing legislation or common law development that will ensure consumers 
a right to recourse against corporations.280 Just at Janus interpreted the Securities 
Exchange Act in a manner that denied investors the ability to sue anyone,281 the 
holding in Concepcion makes it impractical for consumers with small claims against 
retailers a right to remedy.282 As discussed below, this unjust reality of the 
unprotected consumer in the retail market is most acute in the health care 
industry.283 
c. Recent Decisions Regarding Health Care Have Both Expressly and Implicitly 
Illustrated the Court’s Pro-Corporate Jurisprudence 
The health care market — a multibillion dollar-a-year industry encompassing a 
variety of goods and services — requires strong regulations and access to judicial 
remedy provided the severe mental and physical health consequences of 
misconduct.284 However, in a pairing of recent cases involving the health care 
industry, the Court has extended its pro-corporate jurisprudence by protecting 
generic drug manufacturers from liability for inadequate labeling,285 and interpreted 
the Commerce Clause in a manner that makes it significantly more difficult for 
Congress to establish commercial markets where individuals proactively protect 
themselves, and companies are required to market goods and services that allow for 
adequate protections.286 These cases prevent a truly socially responsible health care 
market (and in turn, the safest and healthiest possible general population), and 
commercial markets generally, while providing yet another vignette of a 
jurisprudence that systematically denies the opportunity to hold corporate actors 
responsible for their misconduct, and ensure the safety and soundness of American 
commercial activity.287 
 
 278. 9 U.S.C. § 2.  
 279. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760–62.  
 280. Id. (stating that the FAA was written with Congress’s express intention of preserving the rights of the 
states to define what constitutes unconscionable contract terms, and, the Court’s holding abrogates that 
principal).  
 281. See supra Part IV.A.  
 282. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.  
 283. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.  
 284. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(2) (West 2012) (discussing the wide scope of the health insurance market, the 
growing costs of health care, and negative economic and health consequences of improper medical care).  
 285. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.i.  
 286. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.ii.  
 287. See infra Parts IV.D.2.c.i–ii.  
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i. The Court Has Established a Loophole in Drug Labeling Law Protecting Generic 
Drug Companies from Liability  
In an opinion strikingly similar to Janus, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, the Court 
denied generic drug users a remedy against manufacturers for inadequate 
labeling.288 The opinion, like Janus, was written by Justice Thomas, and was decided 
five-to-four with Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan dissenting.289 
The plaintiffs in PLIVA were denied the opportunity to sue anyone for the physical 
and medical wrong they suffered290 — much like First Derivative members were 
denied the opportunity to sue anyone for the fraudulent statements in the Fund’s 
prospectus.291 Like Janus, PLIVA will have the detrimental consequence of generic 
drug manufacturers consciously labeling their drugs insufficiently because they 
know that they are free from liability absent any action by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).292  
In a consolidated opinion, the Court held that PLIVA — a generic drug 
manufacturer — could not be liable for their failure to provide adequate warning 
labels because their liability under state commercial tort law was pre-empted by 
federal law which denies generic drug manufacturers the ability to unilaterally 
change drug warning labels.293 The 1984 Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act allow generic drugs to forgo extensive studying and testing 
prior to marketing, so long as the manufacturer can sufficiently illustrate 
“sameness” to the brand name drug that must be pre-approved by the FDA.294 As 
such, a generic drug must have the same label as the brand name, and the 
manufacturer must convince the FDA and the brand name drug to adopt different 
 
 288. 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011).  
 289. Id. at 2572, 2582. Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion in all but Part III.B.2. of the opinion. 
Id. at 2571. In this section of the opinion, Justice Thomas asserted that the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution is a non obstante clause — a parliamentary mechanism used to “impliedly repeal conflicting [] 
law.” Id. at 2579–80. As such, it was not necessary, according to the plurality of the Court, for a party facing 
conflicting state and federal laws to proactively find ways to reconcile conflicting state and federal law duties. Id. 
at 2580.  
 290. Id. at 2581 (“Had Mensing and Demahy taken Reglan, the brand-name drug prescribed by their 
doctors . . . their lawsuits would not be pre-empted[,] [b]ut because [their] pharmacists, acting in full accord 
with state law, substituted generic metoclopramide instead, federal law preempts these lawsuits.”); see also id. at 
2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“As a result of today's decision, whether a consumer harmed by inadequate 
warnings can obtain relief turns solely on the happenstance of whether her pharmacist filled her prescription 
with a brand-name or generic drug. The Court gets one thing right: This outcome ‘makes little sense.’”) 
(internal cross-reference omitted).  
 291. See supra Part IV.A.  
 292. See infra notes 297–301 and accompanying text.  
 293. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (“Here, state law imposed a duty on the Manufacturers to take a certain 
action, and federal law barred them from taking that action. The only action the Manufacturers could 
independently take – asking for the FDA's help – is not a matter of state-law concern. Mensing and Demahy's 
tort claims are pre-empted.”).  
 294. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (stating that a generic drug manufacturer must provide “information to 
show that the new drug is bioequivalent to the [brand name] drug”).  
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language to their label in order to maintain labeling equivalence.295 However, the 
Court held that the state law duty did not require the generic manufacturer to 
petition the FDA for a new warning requirement — making PLIVA not liable even 
though they knew their warning labels were inadequate.296  
Due to the Court’s interpretation of federal pre-emption, which allowed PLIVA 
to remain idle, the plaintiffs were denied the ability to sue any entity because federal 
law pre-empted PLIVA’s liability, and there was no cause of action against the 
brand name manufacturer because their pharmacist did not fill the prescription 
with the brand name drug, even thought that is what their doctor prescribed297 — a 
very common practice (occurring nearly 90% of the time when a generic drug is 
available) that is encouraged by both states and the federal government as a means 
providing consumers access to affordable medication.298 This creates an illogical 
situation (which Justice Thomas even recognized as absurd): consumers of 
prescription medication with inadequate labeling are at the mercy of their 
pharmacist, and generic drug manufacturers — a $66 billion a year industry in the 
United States — are free from liability for inadequate liability because they cannot 
unilaterally change their labels, and have no duty to change them absent action 
from the FDA or the brand name manufacturer.299 In PLIVA, like in Janus, the 
Court knowingly interpreted federal law in a manner that expressly denies 
individuals remedy against corporate wrongdoing.300 By shielding generic drug 
manufacturers from liability, the Court missed an opportunity to provide 
individuals adequate remedy, and ensure socially responsible drug labeling.301 This 
protection of generic drug manufactures was complimented this summer by a 
rejection of Congressional commercial regulatory power — again denying 
necessary consumer protection and corporate regulations.302 
ii. The Court’s Restrictive Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Denies Congress the Ability 
to Create Pragmatic Consumer Protection Laws 
Superficially, the Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Businesses 
v. Sebelius, in which it largely upheld President Obama’s signature Affordable Care 
 
 295. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (holding that the respondents “[could not] satisfy [their] state duties 
without the Federal Government's special permission and assistance”).  
 296. Id. at 2581.  
 297. Id. at 2582.  
 298. Id. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION 
FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 27 (1998), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf).  
 299. Id. at 2583–84 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 300. Id.; see Part IV.A.  
 301. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that “[a]s a result [of the decision], 
in many cases, consumers will have no ability to persevere their state–law right to recover for injuries caused by 
inadequate warnings[,]” which, in turn, “could have troubling consequences for drug safety”). 
 302. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.ii.  
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Act (ACA), is representative of a change in the Court’s jurisprudence denying 
consumer protections against corporations (e.g., insurance companies limiting or 
denying coverage to certain individuals).303 However, the nature of the decision 
makes the case a pyrrhic victory for individuals, and will likely leave corporations 
— both generally, and in the health care market specifically — unharmed.304 In 
upholding the individual mandate’s penalty for failure to purchase health insurance 
as a tax, and not a valid regulation of commerce, the Court maintained the practical 
integrity of the ACA because all individuals will be required to purchase insurance 
or pay a penalty.305 In so doing, however, the majority of the Court asserted an 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause306 that is highly restrictive.307 The language 
used in the Chief Justice’s opinion, as well as the joint dissenters’ opinion, rejecting 
the individual mandate to be a valid regulation of commerce unequivocally rejects 
the notion of broad federal power to regulate commercial (in)activity, and reasserts 
the Court’s jurisprudence rejecting broad (and liberal) interpretations of federal 
laws to regulation corporations.308  
 
 303. See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (“The Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individual’s pay 
a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax. Because the 
Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”).  
 304. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.  
 305. See infra note 312.  
 306. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have [p]ower [t]o . . . regulate [c]ommerce with 
foreign [n]ations, and among the several [s]tates, and with the Indian tribes.”).  
 307. Nat’l. Fed. of Ind. Bus. 132 S. Ct. at 2587, 2589, 2591 (stating that “[t]he individual mandate . . . 
compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product” and “[a]ccepting [this 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause] would give Congress the same license to regulate what we do not do” 
would be unacceptable because “[t]he Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual from 
cradle to grave. . . .”) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., 
dissenting) (“If Congress can reach out and command even those furthest from participation in the market, 
then the Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited power, or in Hamilton’s words, ‘the hideous monster 
whose devouring jaws . . . spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane.” (citing THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)))); id. (“[T]he Commerce clause, even 
when supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever will help 
achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation of commerce.”) (emphasis in original); id. at 2648 (“[I]f every 
person comes within the Commerce Clause power of Congress to regulate [their activity] by the simple reason 
that he will one day engage in commerce, the idea of a limited Government power is at an end.”); id. at 2677 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I adhere to my view that the very notion of a substantial effects test under the 
Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s 
early Commerce Clause cases. As I have explained, the Court’s continued use of that test has encouraged the 
Federal Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits. The Government’s 
unprecedented claim in this suit that it may regulate not only economic activity but also inactivity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce is a case in point.”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations 
omitted) (internal citations omitted). But see id. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding that a proper reader 
of the Commerce Clause does grant Congress the power to require individual to purchase health insurance, and 
the majority’s objection is based on the legislation’s “novelty” but “[a]s our national economy grows and 
changes, [the Court] ha[s] recognized, Congress must adapt to the changing economic and financial realities. . . 
. [I]f history is any guide, today’s construction of the Commerce Clause will not endure”).  
 308. See supra note 307. 
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This highly restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause will likely make it harder 
for Congress to pass legislation designed to protect consumers and ensure socially 
responsible corporations.309 As the ACA requires individuals to purchase health 
insurance, it is theoretically plausible that Congress would require businesses to 
purchase virus software to protect their servers from hackers and ensure the safety 
of shareholders’ assets, or pay a substantial penalty. Or, similarly, to ensure the 
safety of American children, Congress could require individuals claiming 
dependents on their annual tax return to provide proof that if they purchased a 
vehicle, it is one that is safe for children, or pay a penalty. Yet, following NFIB, 
despite how logical these laws would be, they would only be upheld, if at all, as a 
tax.310 Therefore, such laws would have to be written with that clear intent — 
making it significantly harder to pass Congress given the general aversion to taxes.311 
Without requiring companies purchase virus software, many would likely forgo the 
purchase as a cost saving measure; and without requiring that parents purchase 
child-safe cars, auto manufacturers would be less inclined to produce such costly 
vehicles — leaving consumers unprotected, and corporations unregulated. 
Furthermore, the Court’s narrow Commerce Clause jurisprudence may even 
inspire future litigation on existing laws and regulations.312 Just as the Court’s 
restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause in NFIB will have the detrimental 
consequence of denying Congress of the ability to pass legislation designed to 
protect consumers,313 so too did it in Walmart v. Dukes,314 take a narrow reading of 
class certification requirements — unnecessarily denying minority individuals class 
action remedy following workplace discrimination.315 
3. The Court’s Restrictive Reading of Class Action Certification Provides Employers a 
Roadmap for Avoiding Employee Class Action Litigation  
In 2007 in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Supreme Court denied Lilly 
Ledbetter a right of action for pay discrimination because her claim was filed more 
 
 309. See infra notes 312 and accompanying text.  
 310. See Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2600 (“The Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain 
individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a 
tax.”).  
 311. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, America’s Aversion to Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2012, at B1 (discussing the 
role the issue of taxes play in our political campaigns and legislation, and the public’s general aversion to 
incurring higher tax liability).  
 312. See Adam Liptak, Justices, By 5-4, Uphold Health Care Law; Roberts In Majority; Victory For Obama, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A1(quoting Yale Law School Professor Akhil Amar as stating that a “dark cloud” 
of the Court’s Commerce Clause language is that “[f]ederal power has more restrictions on it . . . [g]oing 
forward, [causing] there [to] even be laws on the books that have to be re-examined” in light of the Court’s 
holding) (internal quotations omitted).  
 313. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.  
 314. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
 315. See infra Part IV.D.3.  
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than 180 days after the initial violation, and therefore past the statute of 
limitations.316 Recognizing this inadequacy, Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act of 2009, which established that an unlawful discriminatory compensation is 
made every time an employee is paid — thereby restarting the 180-day statute of 
limitations every pay period.317 This new law is a logical amendment to promote 
non-discriminatory pay, while protecting the rights of women and minorities to 
remedy following unfair treatment by their employers.318 Despite this recent change 
in the law, and the underlying recognition that gender-based pay discrimination is a 
reality, the Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes denied a class action certification 
of over two million female Wal-Mart employees scattered across the country for 
lacking commonality of claims per Rule 23(a)(2) because discriminatory hiring 
decisions were made at each store, and not through the corporate headquarters — 
thereby making their claims too disparate for a class action.319  
This high pleading standard unnecessarily imposes restrictive class certification 
standards,320 and, furthermore, disregards recent changes in the law following 
Ledbetter to make it easier for employees to bring discrimination claims against 
their employer. However, most importantly, in holding that Wal-Mart’s de-
centralized decision making disallowed for the proposed class to meet the 
commonality requirement, the Court provided large corporations with a roadmap 
to avoid class action liability: give regional managers or distributors greater control 
in the hiring process.321 Much like the Court’s reasoning in Janus gave companies a 
step-by-step guide of avoiding securities fraud liability,322 in Dukes the Court gave 
corporations explicit guidelines for protecting a company from class actions. 
Following Dukes, decentralized decision-making process in a corporate enterprise 
all but guarantees the inability of disparately located employees to satisfy Rule 
23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement.323 Janus has and will encourage corporate 
misconduct to the detriment of investors,324 so too will Dukes encourage 
 
 316. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007).  
 317. Pub. L. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).  
 318. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. E159, E170 (2009) (statement of Rep. Charles Rangle) (“The passage and 
enactment of this act will restore prior longstanding law which will enable women and others to challenge 
instances of pay discrimination within 180 days of a discriminatory pay check. For too long women have 
performed the same tasks and have been unequally compensated. Unequal pay is not merely a women's issue 
but a disparity that affects all of us.”).  
 319. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011); FED. R. CIV. PRO. R. 23(a)(2) (“One or more members of a class may 
sue or be sued as representatives of all members only if . . . there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class.”).  
 320. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 321. Id. at 2556 (majority opinion) (holding the decentralized decision making process made it impossible 
for the plaintiffs to have a common complaint for class certification). 
 322. See supra Part IV.C.  
 323. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2556 (holding the decentralized decision making process made it impossible for 
the plaintiffs to have a common complaint for class certification). 
 324. See supra Part IV.C.  
Janus Capital Group 
312 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
corporations to adopt management structures designed to avoid litigation, instead 
of actively pursuing policies to promote fair and equal treatment of employees325 — 
making it yet another illustration of the Roberts Court’s holistic jurisprudence that 
continuously promotes the interests of corporations over investors, consumers, and 
employees, and misses opportunities to promote socially responsible corporate 
governance.326 
V. Conclusion 
The Court’s holding in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders327 was a 
three-part failure.328 It misinterpreted, and vastly expanded, the protection of 
secondary actors in Central Bank to extend to primary violators.329 It missed an 
opportunity to judicially create an exception for the investment adviser scenario.330 
And lastly, by focusing on the corporate form, it created a loophole for securities 
fraud violators to avoid liability.331 In the guise of judicial restraint, the Court 
inappropriately further protected corporations and corporate actors from liability, 
and missed an opportunity to judicially complement recent legislative attempts to 
reform financial markets, and promote socially responsible corporations.332 
Furthermore, the Court’s failure in Janus is an illustrative microcosm of a 
jurisprudence that consistently and emphatically protects corporations to the injury 
of individuals333 — creating a zero sum game between private litigants and 
corporate defendants. An equilibrium must be reached, however, where 
corporations are free from oppressive regulations, while still held accountable for 
their actions, and not impervious to the law. Recent decisions by the Roberts Court 
fail to recognize this need, and will prevent socially responsible corporate 
governance, while encouraging and protecting corporate mistreatment of investors, 
consumers, and employees.334  
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